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Abstract:
The paper presents the welfare cost of inflation in a banking time economy that models exchange credit through
a bank production approach. The estimate of welfare cost uses fundamental parameters of utility and production technologies. It is compared to a cash-only economy, and a [Lucas, Robert Jr. E. 2000. “Inflation and Welfare.” Econometrica 68 (2): 247–274.] shopping economy without leisure, as special cases. The paper estimates
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of a 2% inflation rate instead of a zero inflation rate. A zero rate is statutorily specified as the US inflation rate
target in the 1978 Employment Act amendments. The paper provides a conservative welfare cost estimate of
2% inflation instead of zero at $33 billion a year. Estimates of the percent of government expenditure that can
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1 Introduction
The welfare cost of inflation remains an issue of importance given monetary policy’s worldwide adoption of
inflation rate targeting. For example, US Congress passed a 1978 Act amending the 1946 Full Employment Act
to state that the US inflation rate should be zero from 1988 onwards unless other goals conflict with this. The
US Federal Reserve System (Fed) has in recent years established an explicit 2% inflation target, in apparent
violation of statutory law; see Section 2 for details. This leaves important whether inflation, which continually
is a source of government revenue, is very costly as a tax or not, even at low levels of the inflation rate.
The paper shows a “modern”, neoclassical, banking based, view of how to compute the welfare cost of
inflation. Abstracting from the inclusion of capital accumulation, as in Lucas’s (2000) “Inflation and Welfare”,
the paper builds a banking time model rather than Lucas’s shopping time model. Related to Silva (2012), who
endogenizes the number of times banking activity is conducted in order to avoid optimally the inflation tax,
the advantage here is that all parameters are fundamental to either the bank production function or to the
other standard utility and goods technology production frontiers. The resulting welfare cost function shows
the importance of two channels in avoiding the inflation tax: banking, which produces credit, so as to use less
real money for the chosen amount of consumption goods, and secondly leisure use which allows avoidance
of the implicit inflation tax by consuming less goods. As reflected in the interest elasticity of money demand,
as shown below, it ends up that credit use makes money demand much more interest elastic as compared to
leisure use, making credit use the major component of the welfare cost of inflation.
The welfare cost is constructed as the compensating asset endowment required to keep utility when facing
inflation the same as utility at the Friedman (1969) optimum. The result is that in the case of no utility derived
from to leisure, the welfare cost as a fraction of full income is exactly the time used in banking. This extends the
Lucas (2000) result of how, in a similar economy with no leisure, the welfare cost is exactly the shopping time
as in a McCallum and Goodfriend 1987 shopping time economy. Silva (2012) has similar results in his baseline
model without leisure, in that then the welfare cost of inflation is due almost solely to banking activity.1
With substitution towards leisure, the consumer can balance a somewhat lower consumption level against
the use of labor in banking to avoid the inflation tax by using exchange credit. This marginal tradeoff is seen
in terms of the marginal rate of substitution between goods and leisure, which equals the ratio of the shadow
price of goods to leisure. In this shadow price, goods have a shadow cost of exchange that is a weighted average,
Max Gillman is the corresponding author.
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per unit of consumption goods, of the average cost of using money plus the average cost of using credit. The
average exchange cost of using credit results from the banking production function.
The paper presents the welfare cost of a 10% inflation rate instead of a zero inflation, as well as the cost of a 2%
inflation rate instead of a zero rate. It also computes the welfare cases when banking is not permitted (equivalent
to a zero productivity parameter in banking production), but leisure still can be used to avoid inflation, and the
case when leisure is not used (leisure preference is zero) but banking is a viable means to avoid inflation. For
the 2% inflation rate instead of zero, the paper estimates how much national income is being lost relative to the
1978 Act target of a zero inflation rate. This is calculated to be some $33 billion a year.

2 US law on the target inflation rate
According to the US Federal Reserve Bank the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) has since 2012 adopted
an explicit inflation target of 2%. In January 2012 the FOMC stated2
“The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at
the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2012).”
The same January 2012 FOMC statement continues that it will not specify the level of employment to be targeted:
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“The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly
measurable. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment” [bold
added].
In contrast, current US law in the form of the 1978 Amendments to the 1946 Full Employment and Stability Act
precisely sets both the targeted US inflation rate and the US unemployment rate. For inflation, it states that the
US inflation rate should be 3% by 1983 and should be 0% by 1988 and afterwards, unless it conflicts with the
employment goal. For unemployment, rates of 4% for aged 16 and over, and 3% for aged 20 and over, are to be
met within 5 years of the passing of the 1978 Act (so by 1983).
Further, the Act specifies that only the President or Congress can change these goals. The US Federal Reserve
Bank (Fed) is not allowed, by any existing law, to change these goals. Therefore, it is not authorized, without
Presidential or Congressional mandate, to set a 2% inflation rate target as it did in 2012, because the target is
currently specified in law as zero percent unless it conflicts with achieving the unemployment target. And it is not
authorized to change the target unemployment rate of the 1978 Act.3
The Fed seemingly has a big loophole in that the 1978 Act specifies that the inflation rate target may be
higher if it conflicts with the unemployment rate targets. But when the Fed set its 2% inflation target, it also
specifically stated that the inflation target does not affect the unemployment rate, in that this is set by “nonmonetary factors”. So the Fed closes the loophole offered to it under the 1978 Act by saying the inflation and
unemployment rates are “largely” unrelated.
However the Fed’s logic for not setting an unemployment rate goal is faulty. Rather than its authority to
set unemployment rate targets being based on some envisioned relation between the inflation rate and the
unemployment rate, the Fed has no authority to set unemployment rate targets since the fact is that these are
already set in the 1978 Act, which provides no authority to the Fed to alter these targets. It is the specific US
1978 statutory law, which specifically precludes the Fed from having authority to change the unemployment
rate targets, that implies that for the Fed: “it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment”.
The end result is that today the Fed has given no Congressionally valid reason for setting a 2 inflation rate target
in deliberate contradiction of the 1978 Act’s target of a zero inflation rate.
There are four relevant sections of the Act, 4.b1.-4.b.4, which, respectively set out the unemployment rate
goal, the inflation rate target for the first 5 years, the inflation rate target for all years after 1988, and the authority
for changing these targets.
“Section 4.b.(1). reducing the rate of unemployment, as set forth pursuant to Section 3(d) of this Act, to
not more than 3 per centum among individuals aged twenty and over and 4 per centum among individuals aged sixteen and over within a period not extending beyond the fifth calendar year after the first
such Economic Report; and
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Section 4.b.(2) reducing the rate of inflation, as set forth pursuant to Section 3(e) of this Act, to not more
than 3 per centum within a period not extending beyond the fifth calendar year after the first such Economic Report: Provided, That policies and programs for reducing the rate of inflation shall be designed
so as not to impede achievement of the goals and timetables specified in clause (1) of this subsection for
the reduction of unemployment.”
“Section 4.c.(2). Upon achievement of the 3 per centum goal specified in subsection (b) (2), each succeeding Economic Report shall have the goal of achieving by 1988 a rate of inflation of zero per centum:
Provided, That policies and programs for reducing the rate of inflation shall be designed so as not to impede achievement of the goals and timetables specified in clause (1) of this subsection for the reduction
of unemployment.”
Section 4.d states that only the President or Congress may change these goals:
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“if the President finds it necessary, the President may recommend modification of the timetable or
timetables for the achievement of the goals provided for in subsection (b) and the annual numerical goals
to make them consistent with the modified timetable or timetables, and the Congress may take such action as it deems appropriate consistent with title III of the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act
of 1978.”
Using data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment goal of 4% for over 16 years of age was
achieved for briefly in December 1999, and for several months into 2000, when it dipped into the 3+% range.
However, since October 2017 this rate has been below 4%.4 The rate for ages over 20 has been in the 3+ range
since October 2017, being at 3.4% in October 2018.
The legislatively binding US law, which sets the US inflation rate to be zero permanently, seems to be contraindicted such that a permanent 2% inflation rate target is set ”de facto” by the Fed. Would this contradiction
of US law be based on the inability to meet some unemployment goal, it might be acceptable as an interim
policy. But, 1) the Fed FOMC openly admits in January 2012 that monetary policy has little if any ability to
affect the long term employment rate (as quoted above). And 2), the goals of the 1978 law on unemployment
are now largely met, although having taken longer than the 5 years allowed. This achievement of the statutory
US unemployment goals seems to imply unambiguously that the inflation target should now be zero.
To summarize and emphasize the conundrum here: First, the Fed claims the 2 inflation target is not chosen
to achieve the unemployment goal, since it cannot affect unemployment. Second, the unemployment goal appears to have been met as of now anyway. Third, the inference results that the Fed appears to be contravening
statutory law of a 0% inflation rate by their self-established 2% target. If so, then by US law, the Fed 2% inflation target is a judicially challengable over-reach by the Fed relative to US statutory law. While economists can
consult the lawyers, this is clearly controversial, if not illegal, policy practice by the Fed, even though there is
not much of a fuss made over it by academics. Economists though can propose ways to quantify the cost of the
Fed’s contraindiction of the zero inflation rate in favor of the 2% target. This is done here through the standard
approach of the welfare cost of inflation, in terms of a 2% rate compared to zero.

3 Banking time model
Consider an exchange economy using only labor, and no physical capital. With log utility u, over goods ct and
leisure xt ,
𝑢 = ln 𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼 ln 𝑥𝑡 ,

(1)

and a linear production of output using only labor time lt , and with w ∈ R++ ,
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑤𝑙𝑡 ,

(2)

the allocation of time constraint now is that labor, lt , bank production time lQt , and leisure xt equal total endowed
time each period of T. With T normalized to 1, this implies
1 = 𝑙𝑡 + 𝑙𝑄𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡 .

(3)
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In nominal terms, at time t, with a price of goods denoted by Pt , the consumer purchases goods Pt ct , invests in
holding money, Mt+1 − Mt , and invests in holding nominal bonds, denoted by Bt . With Rt denoting the nominal
bond interest rate, this bond investment is 𝐵𝑡+1 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡 ) 𝐵𝑡 . The consumer’s income consists of nominal wages
from working, 𝑃𝑡 𝑤 (1 − 𝑙𝑄𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡 ), plus the nominal government transfer of revenue, Ht . The consumer also
receives each period a real goods endowment of z≥ 0, or Pt z in nominal terms. The budget constraint is:
𝑃𝑡 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡+1 − (1 + 𝑅𝑡 ) 𝐵𝑡 = 𝑤 (1 − 𝑙𝑄𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡 ) + 𝐻𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡 𝑧.

(4)

Let qt denote the real amount of goods that are bought with the credit service provided by the bank, with
these credit purchases being a consumer financial liability due to be paid off by the end of the period from the
consumers deposit account. The other financial liability can be considered to be the cash withdrawn from the
bank deposit account during time t, as determined at the end of the last period. Each of these provide means of
exchange that give rise to the exchange constraint whereby the sum of real money and credit purchases equal
consumption good purchases, ct .
In particular, the exchange constraint is that real consumption can be bought with either real money mt ≡
Mt /Pt , or with real exchange credit qt :
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑚 𝑡 + 𝑞 𝑡 .

(5)
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Let the deposited funds in the bank account be denoted by dt , with these deposits being the consumer’s asset
of the net income deposited in the consumer’s bank account by the goods producer and government transfers (Ht ). The consumer’s assets equal deposits, which in turn equal liabilities of cash withdrawals, mt , plus
credit purchases qt . Given the exchange constraint in equation (5), by which consumption purchases equal the
liabilities of real cash plus credit, this implies that dt = ct is a “balance sheet” constraint, with assets equal to
liabilities. This incarnates the type of constraint recommended by Hicks (1935). At the same time, the banking
service is conducted by providing labor to the production of the credit service, within a representative agent
framework in which the agent also acts in part as a bank. Or as Hicks (1935) puts it, with “every individual in
the community as being, on a small scale, a bank. Monetary theory becomes a sort of generalisation of banking
theory”.5
Following Clark (1984), and the subsequent consistent literature known as the “production approach to
banking” (Degryse, Kim, and Ongena 2009), assume that the credit service production function is specified in
Cobb-Douglas form as
𝛾

𝑞𝑡 = 𝐴𝑄 (𝑙𝑄𝑡 ) (𝑑𝑡 )

1−𝛾

.

(6)
𝛾

𝑙

The per unit of deposit amount of credit service produced is simply (𝑞𝑡 /𝑑𝑡 ) = 𝐴𝑄 ( 𝑑𝑄𝑡 ) . Making the sub𝑡

stitution of consumption goods for deposited funds, apply the balance constraint that dt = ct , since the bank
problem is not decentralized here. Then as in Gillman and Nakov (2003 and 2004), Gillman and Kejak (2004,
2005a, and 2005b), Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004), Benk et al. (2005a, 2005b, 2008, and 2010), Gillman and
Otto (2007) and Gillman and Yerokhin (2005), the consumer acts also as banker and produces the credit service so that the normalized credit production function can be written as 𝑞𝑡 /𝑐𝑡 = 𝐴𝑄 (

𝑙𝑄𝑡
𝑐𝑡 )

𝛾

. Alternatively, the

bank problem can be decentralized by which the consumer chooses dt , along with qt , with dt = ct as an added
constraint of the consumer problem; for such a decentralization of the bank provision of exchange credit in a
similar deterministic setting see Gillman and Kejak (2011).6
Substituting the bank production function of equation (6), with dt substituted by ct , into the the exchange
constraint gives the condition that
𝛾

𝑐𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 + 𝐴𝑄 (𝑙𝑄𝑡 ) (𝑐𝑡 )

1−𝛾

.

(7)

The government budget constraint in turn is that
𝐻𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡+1 − 𝐵𝑡 (1 + 𝑅𝑡 ) ,

(8)

with the provisions that there are zero net bond holdings in equilibrium and that the money supply for here
grows at a constant rate σ such that
4
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𝐻𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑡 = 𝜎𝑀𝑡 .

(9)

1 , the consumer problem in infinite horizon form adds one more variable l to
With a time discount factor of 1+𝜌
Qt
the standard Lucas (1980) cash-only cash-in-advance model, exchanges the shopping time st of the McCallum
and Goodfriend (1987) model with this “banking time” lQt , and instead of a shopping time constraint includes
a cash-in-advance exchange constraint extended to include an explicit money substitute used to avoid the inflation tax, this being exchange credit. With the budget constraint (4) written in real terms, with the time t +
1 inflation rate, πt+1 , defined by 1+𝜋𝑡+1 ≡ 𝑃𝑡+1 /𝑃𝑡 , and with 𝑏𝑡 ≡ 𝐵𝑡 /𝑃𝑡 , then given M0 and B0 ,the consumer
problem is

∞

𝑀𝑎𝑥

𝑐𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡 ,𝑀𝑡+1 ,𝐵𝑡+1 ,𝑙𝑄𝑡

+ 𝜆𝑡 [

∑(
𝑡=0

𝑡

1
) {𝑢 (𝑐𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 )
1+𝜌

−𝑐𝑡 + 𝑤 (1 − 𝑙𝑄𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡 ) − 𝑚𝑡+1 (1 + 𝜋𝑡+1 ) + 𝑚𝑡
]
−𝑏𝑡+1 (1 + 𝜋𝑡+1 ) + 𝑏𝑡 (1 + 𝑅𝑡 ) + 𝐻𝑡 /𝑃𝑡 + 𝑧
𝛾

+ 𝜇𝑡 [−𝑐𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 + 𝐴𝑄 (𝑙𝑄𝑡 ) (𝑐𝑡 )

1−𝛾

(10)

]}.

The first-order equilibrium conditions (FOC) are as follows:
𝛾

𝑙𝑄𝑡
1
𝑐𝑡 ∶ − 𝜆 𝑡 − 𝜇 𝑡 ⎡
⎢1 − (1 − 𝛾) 𝐴𝑄 ( ) ⎤
⎥ = 0;
𝑐𝑡
𝑐𝑡
⎣
⎦
𝑥𝑡 ∶

𝑡

𝑀𝑡+1 ∶ − (

(12)

𝑡+1

𝑡
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𝛼
− 𝜆𝑡 𝑤 = 0;
𝑥𝑡

1
1
1
) 𝜆𝑡 + (
)
1+𝜌
𝑃𝑡
1+𝜌

𝐵𝑡+1 ∶ − (

(𝜆𝑡+1

1
1
1
) 𝜆𝑡 + (
)
1+𝜌
𝑃𝑡
1+𝜌

𝑙𝑄𝑡

(11)

1
𝑃𝑡+1

𝑡+1

𝜆𝑡+1

𝑙𝑄𝑡
∶ −𝜆𝑡 𝑤 + 𝜇𝑡 𝛾𝐴𝑄 ( )
𝑐𝑡

+ 𝜇𝑡+1

1
𝑃𝑡+1

) = 0;

(13)

(1 + 𝑅𝑡+1 )
= 0;
𝑃𝑡+1

(14)

= 0.

(15)

𝛾−1

The equilibrium goods and exchange constraints are that 𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤 (1 − 𝑙𝑄𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡 ) + 𝑧𝑡 , and 𝑐𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 +
𝛾
1−𝛾
𝐴𝑄 (𝑙𝑄𝑡 ) (𝑐𝑡 ) .
The marginal rate of substitution between goods and leisure, MRSc,x , primarily from equations (11) and
(12), is the ratio of the shadow price of goods to the shadow price of leisure. The shadow price of leisure is the
marginal product of labor w. The shadow price of goods consists of the goods cost of one, plus the exchange
cost. The latter is a weighted average of the cost of using money, at an average cost per consumption unit of the
nominal interest rate R, and the cost of using exchange credit, at an average cost per consumption unit of γR.
Since γR < R, because γ ∈ [0, 1), then the average cost of exchange using credit per unit of consumption is less
than that using money. The weights in this weighted average of exchange costs are the share of purchases using
money, or the inverse consumption velocity, 𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑡 , and the share using credit. We can denote at by 𝑎𝑡 ≡ 𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑡 , such
𝑞
that since ct = mt + qt , it results that 1 = 𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡𝑡 . This implies that qt /ct =1-at . This makes MRSc,x equal to
1 + 𝑎𝑡 𝑅𝑡 + (1 − 𝑎𝑡 ) 𝛾𝑅𝑡
𝑥𝑡
=
.
𝛼𝑐𝑡
𝑤

(16)

Note that without leisure, with α = 0, then it results that the marginal benefit of consumption equals its shadow
marginal cost, or 𝑐1𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡 [1 + 𝑎𝑡 𝑅𝑡 + (1 − 𝑎𝑡 ) 𝛾𝑅𝑡 ], and the only way to avoid the inflation tax is with credit use;
the leisure option is eliminated as an escape valve. Alternatively, with no credit available, as in the special case
5
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𝑥𝑡
𝑡
of at = 1 (which occurs when AQ = 0), then equation (16) becomes 𝛼𝑐
= 1+𝑅
𝑤 , as in a Lucas (1980) cash only
𝑡
economy, with leisure.7 Having credit available lowers the exchange cost from R to 𝑅̃ 𝑡 ≡ 𝑎𝑡 𝑅𝑡 +(1 − 𝑎𝑡 ) 𝛾𝑅𝑡 , since
it is always true that 𝑅𝑡 ≥ 𝑎𝑡 𝑅𝑡 + (1 − 𝑎𝑡 ) 𝛾𝑅𝑡 . This can be seen by substituting in the solution for normalized
money demand, at ∈ (0, 1], found in equation (22) below, and differentiating with respect to Rt .
A lower exchange cost means the consumer effectively avoids some of the inflation tax, at the cost of the
banking service, but with the advantage of less substitution towards leisure since the shadow cost of goods
is not as high when credit is available. Choosing more leisure use avoids the inflation tax through less goods
𝑡 )𝛾𝑅𝑡
ct , which occurs when the shadow price of goods to leisure, 1+𝑎𝑡 𝑅𝑡 +(1−𝑎
, rises as a result of an increased
𝑤
money supply growth rate, and a subsequently higher nominal interest rate Rt (even as at falls when Rt rises).
̃

𝑅𝑡
≥ 0. It results, as seen in Section 8 below, that the magnitude of the elasticity of money demand is
That is, 𝜕𝜕𝑅
𝑡
increased much more by the ability to use credit than the ability to use leisure to avoid the inflation tax.
To see the result in full on equation (16) of raising the money supply growth rate, note that from the exchange
𝑀
𝑎 𝑃𝑡+1
constraint, 𝑀𝑡+1 = 𝑡+1
. In the steady state 𝑎𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑡 , and so the money supply growth rate equals the inflation
𝑎𝑡 𝑃𝑡
𝑡
rate; 1 + σ = 1 + π. In addition, the Fisher equation holds from the bond FOC, in equation (14), such that
1 + 𝑅 = (1 + 𝜋) (1 + 𝜌), which in turn equals (1 + 𝜎) (1 + 𝜌) since 𝜎 = 𝜋. This shows that an increase in the
= 1 + 𝜌, so R rises when
exogenous money supply growth rate σ causes R to rise proportionate with (1 + 𝜌); 𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝜎
̃
σ rises, and 𝑅 also rises, but by less that R itself.
The FOC with respect to time in credit service production, lQt , implies the Baumol condition of this model
𝜇
whereby the marginal cost of money equals the marginal cost of exchange credit. In particular, using that 𝜆𝑡 =
𝑡
𝑅t , from the equilibrium conditions for money Mt+1 and bonds Bt+1 , of equations (13) and (14), together with
the lQt FOC, of equation (15), implies that the marginal cost of exchange credit equals the marginal factor cost

w divided by the marginal factor product of (𝜕𝑞𝑡 ) / (𝜕𝑙𝑄𝑡 ) = 𝛾𝐴𝑄 (
𝑅𝑡 =

𝑤
𝑙
𝛾𝐴𝑄 ( 𝑐𝑄𝑡𝑡 )

𝛾−1

𝑙𝑄𝑡
𝑐𝑡 )

𝛾−1

; or
(17)

.

The equalization of the price of exchange credit to its marginal factor cost divided by its marginal factor product,
in equation (17), is a fundamental part of what is termed “price theory”, or competitive microeconomic theory.
Substituting in for
𝛾
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𝑞𝑡 = 𝐴𝑄 (𝑙𝑄𝑡 ) (𝑐𝑡 )

1−𝛾

𝑙𝑄𝑡
𝑐𝑡

from the production function for exchange credit per unit of consumption, whereby

, and so
𝛾

𝑙𝑄𝑡
𝑞𝑡
= 𝐴𝑄 ( ) ,
𝑐𝑡
𝑐𝑡

(18)

implies that
1

𝑞

𝑙𝑄𝑡 ⎛ 𝑐𝑡𝑡 ⎞ 𝛾
⎟ .
=⎜
𝑐𝑡
⎝ 𝐴𝑄 ⎠

(19)

Denoting the marginal cost of exchange credit per unit of consumption by MCq/c , and combining equations (17)
and (19), allows the Baumol condition to be stated in terms of credit per unit of goods, qt /ct :

𝑅𝑡 =

𝑞𝑡
𝑐𝑡

𝑞𝑡
)
=
1 (
𝛾 (𝐴𝑄 ) 𝛾 𝑐𝑡
𝑤

𝑤
1
𝛾

𝛾−1

⎤
𝛾𝐴𝑄 ⎡
⎢( 𝐴𝑄 ) ⎥
⎣
⎦

1−𝛾
𝛾

≡ 𝑀𝐶𝑞/𝑐 .

(20)

1

Let 𝑏̂ ≡ 𝑤/ (𝛾 (𝐴𝑄 ) 𝛾 ), so that the per unit marginal cost more simply is expressed as

𝑀𝐶𝑞/𝑐

6

𝑞
= 𝑏̂ ( 𝑡 )
𝑐𝑡

1−𝛾
𝛾

.

(21)
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4 Calibration
The calibration can be done for the US based on averages for the post-1959 period, viewed generally as a “moderately low inflation” historical period overall, in comparison to international historic experience including
hyperinflation. Consider the standard M1 aggregate, and why it may not be the best basis for the post-1959
calibration. For the 58 years, from Jan. 1959 to Jan. 2018, the M1 velocity average is 6.8. However since the advent of money market fund popularity in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, which initially avoided Regulation
Q interest rate limits, deposits took off in (non-FDIC insured) money market deposit accounts (MMDA) and
remained stagnant in (FDIC insured) deposit accounts. As a result, the income velocity of M1 does not track
well the nominal interest rates such as the 1 year and 10 year US Treasury constant maturity rate, which rose
steadily up until around 1980 and fell steadily thereafter. For this reason, Lucas and Nicolini (2015) construct
a new monetary aggregate by adding the MMDA to M1. For this “M1MMDA” aggregate, they find a stable
money demand function with cointegration evidence, in contrast of the no cointegration findings of Friedman
and Kuttner (1992) using standard monetary aggregates.
Now the Federal Reserve has constructed a new aggregate called MZM that adds the other checking accounts such as MMDA and other similar ones. This is a useful, innovative, aggregate with an income velocity
that rises and falls historically with Treasury interest rates since 1959; this velocity can be found on the FRED
database with the series name of MZMV. While this aggregate allows small amounts of interest to be paid on
deposits such as MMDA, it offers an aggregate for which a stable money demand, such as that in the model,
can be fitted. Therefore MZM offers one basis for the calibration.
The MZM velocity level averaged 2.2 from 1959 to 2018. Thus for the MZM aggregate, a 2.2 velocity level is
the calibration target. In qualification, velocity in the model is the consumption velocity c/m, which is the same
1
.
as the output velocity since y = c in the model without physical capital. With y/m = c/m = 2.2, then 𝑎 ≡ 𝑚𝑐 = 2.2
𝑞
1
𝑚
It results that 𝑐 = 1 − 𝑐 = 1 − 2.2 = 0.545.
An important parameter is the degree of leisure preference. One way to consider this is to look at the economy’s solution for goods and leisure at the Friedman optimum of R = 0. Then the equilibrium solutions are
𝑤 and 𝑥 = 𝛼 . With leisure preference of α = 0.5, then leisure equals 1/3 of free (non-maintenance) time
𝑐 = 1+𝛼
1+𝛼
and work is 2/3 of time by the allocation of time constraint. This is similar to saying that there are five days per
week with eight hours of work per day, for a total of 40 hours a week, while having two weekend days with
eight hours of leisure per day, plus one hour of leisure each of the other five days a week. This gives 21 hours of
leisure and 40 h of work, for a division between work and leisure time as implied approximately in the model
with α = 0.5 at the Friedman optimum.
An alternative calibration, which provides a more conservative basis for calculating the welfare cost of in𝛼 equal to 0.5. This
flation, is to value leisure by twice as much, such that α = 1. This gives leisure time of 𝑥 = 1+𝛼
one-half value for leisure is found within the typical range used in calibration (eg. Gomme and Rupert (2007),
with home production of goods, but not credit services). Even higher values of leisure make inflation even
less costly. We will focus on α = 0.5 as the baseline calibration, with α = 1 as an alternative more conservative
calibration.
Next, consider the Cobb-Douglas coefficient of labor time in banking, that is γ. In the decentralized bank
sector optimization problem, as given in Gillman and Kejak (2011), the parameter γ equals the value of the labor
𝑤𝑙

cost divided by the value of the credit output, as given by 𝛾 = 𝑅𝑞𝑄 . Following Benk, Gillman, and Kejak (2008)
reasoning, consider the total cost of credit to be the cost of an American Express credit card (Amex) per year.
As in the model, an Amex card typically must be paid off at the end of the period to avoid extra fees. But there
is a cost to the card, even though interest is not charged for the credit. This cost is now $95 for an Amex “Blue
Cash Everyday Card”; let the credit cost per person, wlQ , be approximated by this $95. Then the total cost needs
to be divided by Rq to get the implied γ.
Picking which maturity for the Treasury interest rate corresponds to the nominal bond interest rate R in
the model here is complex. Typically, one might consider one period in the model as being for example 1 year
and so use the 1-year Treasury rate. And during the “normal” yet healthy growth periods of the 1960’s, 1980’s
and 1990’s a comparison of the 10 year and 1 year constant maturity US Treasury interest rates shows that the
rates were mostly very close together. In that case, using either the 1-year or the 10 year rate would be of little
consequence.
However, the short term and long term Treasury rates have diverged since 2001. Since the September 2001
terrorist attacks, when the Fed first started driving the Federal Funds Rate below the CPI inflation rate for a
sustained period, the 1 year rate has been below the 10 year rate almost all of the time. Further, the 1 year rate
has also been below the inflation rate for most of the time since 2001, except for the 2 years starting late 2005.
This has meant negative real interest rates as measured by the 1-year rate. In contrast the 10 year rate has had
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only brief periods of negative real interest rates, when inflation accelerated in the mid-1970’s and in 1980, and
for brief period during and since the Great Recession of 2008–2009.
In the model here, a negative real interest rate can only occur with a negative rate of time preference, that
is ρ < 0. But a negative ρ violates boundary conditions on utility, meaning that ρ is constrained to be positive.
Therefore the view taken here is that the nominal interest rate chosen for the calibration should be consistent
with data in which the corresponding real interest rate was mostly positive. Therefore, the 10 year Treasury
rate is chosen as the nominal interest rate that corresponds best to the R of the model, for the full data period
of 1959–2018; this is nearly equivalent to choosing the 1 year Treasury rate for the period ending in 2000.8
The average 10-year Treasury bond rate, at an annual rate on a monthly basis, is 6.13 from 1959:1 to 2018:1.
The 10 year Treasury rate has mostly positive real interest rates for the full period, so a 6.13 rate is chosen for
the calibration for 1959–2018. It turns out that the calculated welfare cost is only slightly changed if 5.10, the
1959–2018 1-year Treasury bill rate, were used instead, while in contrast it is quite sensitive to the preference
for leisure.
Now consider an approach for calibrating the rate of time preference ρ by considering historical data on
the real rate of interest for the Treasury interest rates relative to CPI inflation rates. Before the Vietnam War
spending began ratcheting upwards, the annual inflation rate, taken by month, averaged 1.4% for the 7 years
from Jan. 1959 to Jan. 1966. In the 1980’s, the inflation rate fell to 3.8% in December 1982, and then averaged
4.5% for the 7 years from December 1982 to December 1989. For the 11 years from January 1990 to January
2000, the inflation rate averaged 4.3%. During these episodes of mostly healthy, above trend growth and stable
relatively low inflation, the 1-year and 10-year real interest rates were of mostly similar magnitude and ranged
from around 2 to 4%. Picking a midpoint, the calibration will assume that ρ = 0.03, giving a 3% real rate of
interest.
Measure the credit q as 𝑞 = 𝑐 (1 − 𝑎), from the exchange constraint in equation (5). Given from above that
with MZM velocity, 1 − a = 0.545, it remains to find consumption per capita. This has trended steadily upwards
except during the 2008–2009 recession. From FRED data (series A794RX0Q048SBEA), the average real per-capita
consumption in 2009 dollars is $22432 from Jan. 1959 to Jan. 2018. Put this $22432 in current prices by factoring it
for $22432. Then
by the change in the CPI from May 2009 to March 2018, so as to give an additional factor of 250
213
the calibration of γ is that 𝛾 =

𝑤𝑙𝑄
𝑅𝑐(1−𝑎)

=

95
(0.0613)[(22432) 250
](0.545)
213

= 0.11, within the range of (0.11, 0.21) calibrated

in Benk, Gillman, and Kejak (2005a, 2005b, 2008, and 2010).
𝑞

Now use equations (20) and (21), such that 𝑅 = 𝑏̂ ( 𝑐𝑡𝑡 )
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that 𝑅 = 0.061 = 𝑏̂ (0.545)
𝑤
,
1/0.11
(0.11)(𝐴𝑄 )

1−0.11
0.11

then 8. 24 =

= 𝑏̂ (0.0074), so that 𝑏̂ =

𝑤
.
1/0.11
(0.11)(𝐴𝑄 )

1−𝛾
𝛾

0.061
0.0074

, with

𝑞𝑡
𝑐𝑡

= 0.545 and 𝑏̂ ≡

𝑤

1

. Then we have

𝛾(𝐴𝑄 ) 𝛾

= 8.24. Since 𝑏̂ is comprised of the factors

𝑤

1

=

𝛾(𝐴𝑄 ) 𝛾

0.11

1
With a normalization of w = 1, then 𝐴𝑄 = ( 8. 24(0.11)
)

= 1.01. So in

sum, the baseline calibration assumes that w = 1, AQ = 1.01, γ = 0.11, and R = 0.061, such that the targeted MZM
velocity of 2.2 is achieved; in addition α = 0.5. As a percent of GDP, the estimates of the welfare cost of inflation
as a share of full income (z/(1 ⋅ w)) resulting from the calibrations here will in turn rise by a factor of 1.5, since
y/w = c/w=c ≃ 0.67 in the model with α = 0.5.
As a second alternative calibration (in addition to setting α = 1 instead of α = 0.5), consider using the historical
average of M1 velocity instead of MZM velocity. From Jan. 1959 to Jan. 2018, M1 velocity averaged 6.8; with c/m
= 6.8, then

𝑞
𝑐

=1−𝑎=1−
𝑞

Then 𝑅 = 𝑏̂ ( 𝑐𝑡𝑡 )
so that 𝑏̂ =

0.061
0.115

1−𝛾
𝛾

, with

1
6.8

𝑞𝑡
𝑐𝑡

= 0.85. Calibrating γ then implies that 𝛾 =

= 0.85 and 𝑏̂ ≡

𝑤
𝛾(𝐴𝑄

1
)𝛾

𝑤𝑙𝑄
𝑅𝑐(1−𝑎)

=

95
(0.061)((22432) 250
)(0.85)
213

. Then we have that 𝑅 = 0.061 = 𝑏̂ (0.85)

= 0.53. Since 𝑏̂ is comprised of the factors
0.07
1
( 0.53(0.07)
)

𝑤
𝛾(𝐴𝑄

1
)𝛾

=

𝑤
,
1/0.11
(0.11)(𝐴𝑄 )

1−0.07
0.07

then 0.53 =

≃ 0.07.

= 𝑏̂ (0.115),

𝑤
.
1/0.07
(0.07)(𝐴𝑄 )

With a normalization of w = 1, then 𝐴𝑄 =
= 1. 26. The calibration when enforcing the equilibrium
condition of equation (20) ends up lowering the labor share parameter γ and raising the bank productivity
parameter AQ . This use of M1 instead of MZM results in a lower welfare cost of inflation.

5 Credit supply and money demand
It is useful to visualize the equilibria at the basis of the above calibrations. Figure 1 graphs equation (21). With
𝑤
= 8. 24, R = 0.061, and q/c = 0.545, the graphs shows that the marginal cost per unit of consumption,
𝑏̂ =
1

𝛾(𝐴𝑄 ) 𝛾

8
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denoted by MCq/c , has a unique equilibrium division between credit and money, at q/c = 0.545, with velocity
of 2.2, where R = MCq/c . Using MZM for the baseline calibration (solid line in Figure 1), this marginal cost is
denoted by MC (MZM). Alternatively shown is the marginal cost using M1 in the calibration (dotted line in
Figure 1), denoted by MC (M1).9

Figure 1: Marginal cost of exchange credit per unit (MC) equals the marginal cost of money per unit (R).
𝑞

Taking the same Baumol condition but now writing in terms of 𝑚𝑐 = 1 − 𝑐 , then the output normalized
money demand function m/c is given implicitly in equilibrium by 𝑅 = 𝑏̂ [1 − (𝑚/𝑐)](1−𝛾)/𝛾 , whereby 𝑚/𝑐 =
1 − ( 𝑅̂ )
𝑏

𝛾/(1−𝛾)

, or
𝛾

1
𝑚
𝑅𝛾 1−𝛾
𝑎≡
=1−(
)
(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 .
𝑐
𝑤

(22)

Money demand falls with the interest rate R, rises with labor productivity w and falls with bank productivity
AQ . Figure 2 graphs the inverse money demand equation, 𝑅 =

𝑤
𝛾

1

((1 − 𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑡 )/ (𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 )

(1−𝛾)/𝛾

for this calibra-
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tion when R = 0.061, 𝑚/𝑐 = 1/ (2.2) = 0.455 and velocity is 2.2. The baseline using MZM is indicated in the
graph by m/c (MZM), while the alternative using M1 in the calibration is indicated by m/c (M1).

Figure 2: Banking time money demand function.
𝑚

𝑡 𝛾
The interest elasticity of normalized money 𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑡 , denoted by η, is 𝜂𝑅𝑐 = − 1−𝑎
𝑎𝑡 1−𝛾 . This means as the interest
rate goes up, the interest elasticity becomes increasingly negative as in a Cagan money demand. In fact, the
elasticity has a simple proportionality to q/m, the credit to cash ratio, that rises with the nominal interest rate
R:

−

𝛾 1 − 𝑎𝑡
𝛾 𝑞
=−
.
1 − 𝛾 𝑎𝑡
1−𝛾𝑚

(23)

−0.11 0.545
= −0.15. Other estimates are used, such as the
With the calibration, the elasticity is rather low at 1−0.11
0.455
classic Baumol (1952) estimate of −0.5 in Lucas (2000). Note however that this elasticity is not constant as in
Baumol, but instead rises with the inflation rate in a way similar to Cagan (1956). For Cagan, the interest elasticity is −𝑅𝑏,̄ with 𝑏̄ the “semi-interest elasticity”, so that the elasticity rises linearly in magnitude with R, as
found for the US and UK by Benati et al. (2016)
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𝛾 𝑞
− 1−𝛾
𝑚

In the banking time money demand, this elasticity is
constants 𝑏1̂ and 𝑏2̂ , such that the elasticity is −𝑏1̂
𝑏̂

(

𝑏̂ 1
𝑏̂ 1 /𝛾
𝑅𝛾
𝑤 ) (𝐴𝑄 )

1−( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

𝑏̂ 1

(𝐴𝑄 )

𝑏̂ 1 /𝛾

𝑅𝛾

=

𝛾

1

( 𝑤 ) 1−𝛾 (𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾
𝛾
𝛾
1
1−𝛾
1−𝛾
1−( 𝑅𝛾
(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾
𝑤 )

= −𝑏1̂

̂
𝑏̂ 2 (𝑅)𝑏1
,
̂
1−𝑏̂ 2 (𝑅)𝑏1

. Rewrite this using

where 𝑏1̂ ≡

𝛾
,
1−𝛾

and 𝑏2̂ ≡

𝑏̂ /𝛾

𝛾 1
1
. Figure 3 graphs the elasticity magnitude. It shows how it rises from zero at the Friedman
( 𝑤 ) (𝐴𝑄 )
optimum of R = 0, at a varying rate, as R rises (solid curve). In comparison, a Cagan (1956) type elasticity
magnitude that is linearly rising with R is graphed in the dashed line; here the slope is denoted by 𝑏,̄ which
equals 2, less than for example the 7 value used in Cagan for certain hyperinflation examples. The elasticity
using the alternative calibration with M1 is also graphed, in Blue; here the dashed line corresponding to a
linearly rising Cagan elasticity has a slope of 𝑏̄ = 8. The interest elasticity of m/c is important to the welfare cost
in that it determines the nature of the deadweight-loss ”triangles” under the marginal cost curve in Figure 1 and
under the money demand curve in Figure 2. However the welfare cost can be derived in general equilibrium
without integrating under the money demand curve.

Figure 3: Interest elasticity of banking time money demand (solid) versus cagan (dashed).
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6 Welfare cost of inflation
The welfare cost of inflation is calculated by determining the compensating amount of goods z that is required
to make the consumer equally well off when facing a positive inflation tax, of R>0, as when the consumer is
instead at the optimum at which R =z= 0. Using the indirect utility function v as depending in general on R
and z, with the optimum utility being that level of v at which z=R=0, the following equation allows for the
determination of the cost z:
𝑣 (𝑅, 𝑧) = 𝑣 (0, 0) .

(24)

The indirect utility v denotes the agent’s utility with the equilibrium goods and leisure substituted in. Given that
there is no growth so that time subscripts can be dropped, use the marginal rate of substitution between goods
and leisure in equation (16) to solve for leisure and substitute this into the budget constraint of equation (4);
also use the government budget constraint of equation (8) to eliminate the money and bond terms in equation
(4). This yields the following expression for the equilibrium goods c along the stationary state:

𝑐 = 𝑤 (1 − 𝑙𝑄 −

𝛼𝑐 [1 + 𝑎𝑅 + (1 − 𝑎) 𝛾𝑅]
) + 𝑧.
𝑤

(25)

The solution to lQ comes from the bank production function, given that the equilibrium q/c and m/c have been
solved, with 1 =
in which
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𝑞𝑡
𝑐𝑡

𝑞
𝑐

+

= 𝐴𝑄 (

𝑚 . In
𝑐
𝛾

𝑙𝑄𝑡
𝑐𝑡 )

particular, with 𝑞/𝑐 = ( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

𝛾
1−𝛾

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 , and from the production in equation (18)

, setting these equal provides the solution lQ /c:
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𝛾

𝛾

1
𝑙𝑄
𝑅𝛾 1−𝛾
(
)
(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 = 𝐴𝑄 ( ) ;
𝑤
𝑐

(26)

1

𝑙𝑄
𝑅𝛾𝐴𝑄 1−𝛾
=(
)
.
𝑐
𝑤
𝑅𝛾𝐴

1
1−𝛾

With this solution and given the solution for a ≡ m/c in equation (22), write lQ as 𝑐 ( 𝑤 𝑄 )
and substitute
this into equation (25) so that the closed-form solution for c can be derived in terms of various parameters
including R (which equals (1 + 𝜌) (1 + 𝜎) − 1), with ρ and σ assumed parameters):
(1 + 𝑧/𝑤) 𝑤

𝑐=
1 + 𝑤 (𝑅𝛾𝐴𝑄 /𝑤)

1
1−𝛾

+ 𝛼 [1 + (1 − ( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

𝛾
1−𝛾

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 ) 𝑅 + (( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

𝛾
1−𝛾

.

1

The solution for leisure follows directly from the intratemporal margin, whereby 𝑥𝑡 =
the solution for c from equation (27),

𝛼𝑐[1+𝑎𝑅+(1−𝑎)𝛾𝑅]
.
𝑤

𝛼 [1 + 𝑎𝑅 + (1 − 𝑎) 𝛾𝑅] (1 + 𝑧/𝑤)

𝑥=
1 + 𝑤 (𝑅𝛾𝐴𝑄 /𝑤)

1
1−𝛾

+ 𝛼 [1 + (1 − ( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

𝛾
1−𝛾

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 ) 𝑅 + (( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

(27)

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 ) 𝛾𝑅]

𝛾
1−𝛾

Using

(28)

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 ) 𝛾𝑅]

The welfare cost of inflation then follows from 𝑣 (𝑅, 𝑧) = 𝑣 (0, 0) such that
(1 + 𝑧/𝑤) 𝑤

ln

1

1 + 𝑤 (𝑅𝛾𝐴𝑄 /𝑤) 1−𝛾 + 𝛼 [1 + (1 − ( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )
𝛼 [1 + (1 − ( 𝑅𝑤𝑡 𝛾 )
+ 𝛼 ln

𝛾
1−𝛾

𝛾
1−𝛾

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 ) 𝑅 + ( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 ) 𝑅 + ( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

1
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1 + 𝑤 (𝑅𝛾𝐴𝑄 /𝑤) 1−𝛾 + 𝛼 [1 + (1 − ( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )
= ln

𝛾
1−𝛾

𝛾
1−𝛾

𝛾
1−𝛾

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 𝛾𝑅]

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 𝛾𝑅] (1 + 𝑎/𝑤)
̂

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 ) 𝑅 + ( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

𝛾
1−𝛾

(29)

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 𝛾𝑅]

𝑤
𝛼
+ 𝛼 ln
.
1+𝛼
1+𝛼

The solution is that
𝑧/𝑤
1

1 + 𝑤 (𝑅𝛾𝐴𝑄 /𝑤) 1−𝛾 + 𝛼 [1 + (1 − ( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )
=
(1 + 𝛼) [1 + (1 − ( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

𝛾
1−𝛾

(𝐴𝑄 )

1
1−𝛾

𝛾
1−𝛾

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 ) 𝑅 + (( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

) 𝑅 + (( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

𝛾
1−𝛾

(𝐴𝑄 )

1
1−𝛾

𝛾
1−𝛾

1

(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾 ) 𝛾𝑅]
𝛼/(1+𝛼)

−1

(30)

) 𝛾𝑅]

For the baseline calibration, γ = 0.11, α = 0.5, w = 1, and AQ = 1.01. Putting in these values, then the cost for any R
gives the function 𝑤𝑧 (𝑅).10 Figure 4 graphs the welfare cost function showing for example how R = 0.133 (when
π = 0.10) gives a cost of 1.48% of full income. Normalizing the welfare cost by consumption basically factors the
cost by 1.5 since at R = 0, 𝑐 = 𝑤/ (1 + 𝛼) = 0.67, and it falls some as R rises; so with this normalization the cost
would be about (1.48) 1.5 = 2.2, or about 2.2% of output for R = 0.133.
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Figure 4: Welfare cost of inflation: MZM baseline calibration (solid); Alternative 1: MZM α = 1 (Dashed); Alternative 2:
M1 (dotted).

To compute the cost of a 10% inflation rate versus a zero inflation rate, similar to the most common calculation of welfare cost found in the literature (eg. Bailey 1956; Silva 2012) consider that 1 + 𝑅 = (1 + 𝜋) (1 + 𝜌).
With ρ = 0.03 and π = 0.10, then R = 0.133 gives a cost of 1.5% as a share of full income. But at π = 0, R
= ρ, and so the welfare cost of 𝑤𝑧 (𝑅) = 𝑤𝑧 (0.03) must be subtracted from the cost 𝑤𝑧 (0.133) to compute
the cost of 10% inflation instead of zero. Therefore the cost of a 10% inflation rate instead of a zero rate is
𝑧
𝑧
𝑤 (0.133) − 𝑤 (0.03) = 0.0148 − 0.0036 = 0.011, or 1.1% of full income. Again, put in terms of the cost as a share
of output, instead of as a share of full income (w), this rises to about (1.1) 1.5 = 1.65, or about 1.65%. These cost
estimates are well within the range of the literature; see Adao and Silva (2018) and Silva (2012).
Now consider the alternative calibration with leisure preference doubled from α = 0.5 to α = 1. Then the cost
estimate for R = 0.133 is 0.47 of full income, about half the level when α = 0.5. This is shown in Figure 4 by the
𝑧
𝑧
̂
dashed line.11 For the cost of a 10% inflation rate instead of a zero rate, the cost is now ̂
𝑤 (0.133) − 𝑤 (0.03) =
0.0047 − 0.0009 = 0.0038, or 0.38% of full income. With c ≃ 0.5 in this case, the cost z/c is about (2) 0.38 = 0.76,
or 0.76% as a share of output. With a higher preference for leisure, the cost of avoiding inflation is lower. This
results since leisure use gives greater utility and is a way to avoid the inflation tax, along with credit use. Credit
use itself, per unit of consumption, does not change, and the money demand function as drawn for m/c in
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𝑅𝛾𝐴

1
1−𝛾

Figure 2 above is also unchanged. Total time in credit, 𝑙𝑄 = 𝑐 ( 𝑤 𝑄 ) , does fall as consumption falls when
leisure preference rises.
The other alternative calibration is to use M1 instead of MZM. This gives a different calibration and welfare
cost. Using the baseline values of α = 0.5, w = 1, the changes are that γ = 0.07 and AQ = 1.26. Figure 4 shows this
case with the dotted line; it is generally placed inbetween the baseline case in the solid line and the alternative
1 = 0.65 at R = 0. The welfare cost of R = 0.133 is 0.70% of full income,
with α = 1 in the dashed line. Here 𝑐 = 1+𝛼
in this third case. As a fraction of output, the 0.70 rises to 0.7 (1.5) = 1.05, or about 1.05% since c ≃ 0.67. To find
𝑧
𝑧
̃
the cost of a 10% inflation rate instead of a zero inflation rate, ̃
𝑤 (0.133) − 𝑤 (0.03) = 0.0070 − 0.0019 = 0.0051,
or 0.51% of full income, and about 0.76% as a fraction of output. This 0.76% is the same magnitude as with the
alternative MZM calibration with α = 1.

7 Low inflation regime welfare cost
While low inflation rates can be negative, a positive 2% inflation rate is both a low inflation rate and a level
that is ubiquitous in the lexicon of inflation rate targeting policies both in the US and around the world. At
the same time, ever since Friedman’s (1969) optimum of a negative rate of inflation as the optimum, there has
been a conflict between the theoretical optimum rate of inflation and the policy practice, in that policy seems to
avert systemically a negative rate of inflation. A zero rate of inflation however is often mentioned as a feasible
inflation rate target, such as in US law, while the 2% target has morphed into the accepted rate of inflation to
target by central banks.
There are many theoretical reasons given for targeting a rate of inflation above the Friedman (1969) optimum,
for example with foci on the nature of Laspeyres (CPI) and Paache (GDP deflator) indices and the so-called
substitution bias. This latter distinction on how the indices are calculated has been made innocuous by the
development of chained indices that mostly eliminate the Laspeyres tendency to overstate the inflation rate.
The quality measurement problem is a long standing one also used to suggest that a higher inflation rate target
than otherwise is warranted because the goods being indexed are of a higher quality and naturally worth more.
There are also monopoly power justifications given for aiming for a positive inflation rate target.
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Putting aside the various justifications for above-zero inflation rate targets, let’s simply consider the cost of
following a central bank target of 2% versus US law’s statement of a zero inflation rate, as calculated within
this economy with banking time. To apply the model here, a 2% inflation rate corresponds to an R of 𝑅 =
(1 + 0.02) (1 + 0.03) − 1 = 0.051. With the baseline calibration, from equation (30) above, calculate 𝑤𝑧 (0.051) −
𝑧
𝑤 (0.03) as 0.006−0.0036 = 0.0024, or 0.24% of full income. As a percent of output, this becomes about 0.24 (1.5) =
0.36 of one percent.
𝑧
𝑧
̂
Using the more conservative alternative calibration with α = 1, this becomes ̂
𝑤 (0.051) − 𝑤 (0.03) = 0.0011 −
0.0009 = 0.0002, or 0.02% of full income. As a percent of output, c = 0.5 at R = 0 in this case, so the cost is about
0.04% of output.
𝑧
𝑧
̃
Lastly, using the calibration with α = 0.5 but using the aggregate M1, the welfare cost is ̃
𝑤 (0.051)− 𝑤 (0.03) =
0.003 − 0.0019 = 0.0011, or 0.11 of one percent of full income. As a percent of output, this is approximately
(0.11) 1.5 = 0.165, or 0.165% of output.
To summarize, in the baseline, for a two percent inflation rate instead of a zero inflation rate, the welfare
cost of this inflation is 0.36% of output. With a $20 trillion US economy, this welfare cost is $20(0.0036) = $0.072,
trillion, or about $72 billion a year. With the most conservative of the alternative calibrations (MZM with α = 1)
it is $20(0.0004) = $0.008 trillion, or $8 billion a year. The second alternative calibration, using M1, gives a cost
inbetween the other two at $20(0.00165) = 0.033 trillion, or $33 billion a year.
This gives a range of estimates from in billions of dollars from 8 to 33 to 72 per year due to hitting a target
inflation rate of 2% instead of one of zero as specified in the 1978 Act. As of October 2018, CPI inflation is 2.5%
at an annual rate, so the welfare cost currently is actually even higher as compared to a zero inflation rate.

8 Comparison to models without credit and/or leisure
Compare the welfare cost of inflation in the baseline model with credit and leisure to models in which there
is either no credit, no leisure, or neither credit or leisure. First consider a cash-only economy, with leisure, but
1+𝛼(1+𝑅)
without credit available. In this case m/c = 1, q/c = 0, lQ = 0, and from equation (30), 𝑧/𝑤 =
− 1.
𝛼/(1+𝛼)
For α = 0.5 and R = 0.133, the cash only welfare cost is

1+0.5(1+0.133)
(1+0.5)(1+0.133)0.5/(1+0.5)

(1+𝛼)(1+𝑅)

− 1 = 0.0018, or 0.18% of full income.

As a share of output, since c ≃ 0.67, then the welfare cost is (0.18) 1.5%, or about 0.27%. For a 10% inflation rate
1+0.5(1+0.03)
instead of zero, the estimate in this case is 0.18 minus the cost of R = 0.03, which is
0.5/(1+0.5) −1 = 0.097.
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(1+0.5)(1+0.03)

This gives a cost of 0.08% of full income, or (0.08) 1.5, 0.12% of output.
For R = 0.133, this 0.18% is eight-fold smaller than the higher welfare cost of 1.48% when credit is available
through banking, in the baseline economy above. This lower welfare cost without credit available is due to there
being only goods to leisure substitution available to avoid the inflation tax in the cash only case. With cash only,
the interest elasticity of m/c in equation (23) is zero, making money always inelastically demanded, and causing
a relatively low welfare cost of inflation. The higher interest elasticity and welfare cost with credit stems from
the ability to substitute from cash to credit, while also using the goods to leisure substitution margin.
Now consider the case with no leisure. To do this, simply assume leisure is not valued, as in Lucas’s (2000)
shopping time model. What would be the welfare cost of inflation in this case, with banking time use instead
of shopping time? Setting α = 0 in the welfare cost function of equation (30) above results in
1

𝑧/𝑤 = 𝑤 (𝑅𝛾𝐴𝑄 /𝑤) 1−𝛾 = 𝑤

𝑙𝑄
,
𝑐

(31)
𝑙𝑄
𝑐 . The calculation of
1
1−(0.11)
= 0.0088,
1 ( (0.133)(0.11)(1.01)
)
1

which by equation (26) is also the value of the banking time per unit of consumption, 𝑤
1

welfare cost with the same calibration and R = 0.133 is 𝑤 (𝑅𝛾𝐴𝑄 /𝑤) 1−𝛾 =
or 0.88% of full income. As a share of output, since consumption is nearly 1 in this case, it is the same
0.88% as a share of output. In terms of a 10% inflation rate instead of 0, the cost in this case is 0.87767 −
1

1−(0.11)
= 0.87602, which is the same 0.88% when rounded off. This welfare cost estimate is
1 ( (0.03)(0.11)(1.01)
)
1
higher than when there is no credit, but leisure is valued at α = 0.5 as above; in the latter case the cost is 0.18%
of full income.
With R = 0.133, the cost from only banking time to avoid inflation of 0.88 compares to 1.48% when there is
also leisure preference, and to 0.18 when there is leisure but not banking. This means that with only leisure to
avoid inflation, the welfare cost is the lowest, since leisure is not a great substitute for goods, and this makes
money demand relatively interest inelastic. When in contrast only credit is available but not leisure, the welfare
cost is higher since credit use alone to avoid inflation is a better substitute than leisure use alone. The interest
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elasticity of money demand is higher in magnitude with credit use alone than with leisure use alone. With both
credit and leisure use to avoid inflation the interest elasticity is higher in magnitude and so is the welfare cost.
𝑚
𝛾 𝑞
To see this in terms of elasticities, the magnitude of the interest elasticity of m/c is 𝜂𝑅𝑐 = − 1−𝛾
𝑚 =
𝛾

1

𝑅𝛾 1−𝛾
(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾
( 𝑤 )
𝛾
− 1−𝛾
𝛾
1
1−𝛾
(𝐴𝑄 ) 1−𝛾
1−( 𝑅𝛾
𝑤 )

, which equals 0.185 for the baseline calibration with R = 0.133; this can be seen in Figure

3.. When credit q equals zero, this interest elasticity of m/c equals zero. Then the only elasticity of money with
𝑚 , when m = c always, is the same as the interest elasticity of c; 𝜂𝑚 = 𝜂𝑐 .
respect to the interest rate, denoted by 𝜂𝑅
𝑅
𝑅
𝛼𝑅
𝑤
and the elasticity with respect to R is 𝜂𝑐𝑅 = 1+𝛼(1+𝑅)
= 𝑐𝛼𝑅
By equation (27), with q = 0, then 𝑐 = 1+𝛼(1+𝑅)
𝑤 . In

(0.5)0.133
𝑚 =
𝛼𝑅
the case of no credit, and with R = 0.133 and α = 0.5, then 𝜂𝑅
= 1+(0.5)(1+0.133)
= 0.042. This is a low
1+𝛼(1+𝑅)
elasticity, being almost zero.
The interest elasticity magnitudes, given the baseline calibration, triples with credit only as a substitute to
money use, but no leisure, as compared to the case of leisure only and no credit. With credit only, the elasticity of
𝑚
𝑚 = 𝜂 𝑐 +𝜂𝑐 .
m with respect to R is the elasticity of 𝑚𝑐 with respect to R plus the elasticity of c with respect to R; 𝜂𝑅
𝑅
𝑅
𝑤
With no leisure, c is now given from equation (27) as 𝑐 =
1 . The interest elasticity of this c is
1+𝑤(𝑅𝛾𝐴𝑄 /𝑤) 1−𝛾

𝑐 =−
𝜂𝑅

𝑅𝛾
𝛾
1
(𝑐 − 𝑚) (
)=−
1−𝛾
𝑤
1−𝛾

𝑐
𝑐

− 𝑚𝑐
𝑚
𝑐

(

𝑅𝑚
𝑚 ( 𝑅𝑚 ) .
) = 𝜂𝑅
𝑤
𝑤

This makes the interest elasticity of money m with respect to R equal to
𝑚

𝑚

𝑚 = 𝜂 𝑐 + 𝜂𝑐 = 𝜂 𝑐 [1 +
𝜂𝑅
𝑅
𝑅
𝑅

𝑅𝑚
].
𝑤

With the baseline calibration, at R = 0.133, this elasticity magnitude is 0.195.12 The higher interest elasticity with
only credit, but no leisure, corresponds to the higher welfare cost of inflation for this case, as compared to when
there is positive leisure, but no credit use; these are 0.88% versus 0.18%, respectively for R = 0.133.
The interest elasticity for the full model with both credit and leisure can be calculated from equation (27) as
𝑚

𝑚
𝑐
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𝑚 =𝜂
𝜂𝑅
𝑅

𝛼𝑎𝑅 [1 − 𝜂𝑅𝑐 (1 − 𝛾 + 𝛼1 )]
𝛾 1−𝑎
𝑐
−
+ 𝜂𝑅 = −
.
1
1−𝛾 𝑎
1 + 𝑤 (𝑅𝛾𝐴𝑄 /𝑤) 1−𝛾 + 𝛼 [1 + 𝑎𝑅 + (1 − 𝑎) 𝛾𝑅]

With the baseline calibration, and R = 0.133, this elasticity magnitude is equal to 0.212, and it corresponds to
the higher welfare cost of 1.48%.13
Note that a banking time cost, or a related shopping time cost as in Lucas (2000), without leisure value
but with time, can be viewed an underestimate of welfare cost relative to when leisure is valued. Without
𝑙
leisure value, the welfare cost z/w in equation (31) is analytically equal to 𝑤 𝑐𝑄 , by equation (26). Calculating
𝑙
this directly, 𝑤 𝑐𝑄 = (0.0088), as found above, while 𝑙𝑄 = 𝑐 (0.0088) = 0.646 (0.0088) = 0.0057. In the related
Lucas example, the welfare cost is exactly the shopping time, which Lucas denotes by s(r). In his equation 5.7,
he defines this welfare cost and comments that
“In this model, the time spent economizing on cash use, s(r), has the dimensions of a percentage reduction in production and consumption, and hence is itself a direct measure of the welfare cost of inflation,
interpreted as wasted time.”
The welfare cost comparison between the banking time and shopping time models is a valid one in that the
banking time model can be restated exactly as a shopping time function in formal terms. To see this, recall that
banking time is lQ , with

𝑙𝑄
𝑐

𝑞

1
𝛾

= ( 𝐴𝑐 ) . Substituting in 1 −
𝑄

𝑚
𝑐

for

𝑞
𝑐

gives that 𝑙𝑄 = 𝑐 (

special case of the so called shopping time model in that the function 𝑐 (
𝜕𝑙𝑄
𝜕𝑐

1− 𝑚
𝑐
𝐴𝑄
𝑚

)

1
𝛾

1− 𝑚
𝑐
𝐴𝑄

1
𝛾

) . This is an exact

has the same characteristics
𝜕𝑙

−𝑙

= 𝑙𝑄 (1 + 𝛾1 1−𝑐 𝑚 ) > 0, and 𝜕𝑚𝑄 = 1− 𝑄𝑚 < 0, just
𝑐
𝑐
as is the case for the general shopping time specification of 𝑠 = 𝑔 (𝑐, 𝑚) in which gc > 0 and gm < 0, with s the
shopping time used to avoid the inflation tax.
1
With no leisure and only banking time, now 𝑐 =
= 0.99 and total banking time also
1

as the shopping time general specification. In particular,

1+1(0.133(0.11)1.01/1) 1−0.11

rises to (0.99) (0.0088) = 0.0087, while labor is 1 − 0.0087 = 0.99. Results imply more banking is done, since
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leisure cannot be used to substitute away from the inflation tax on goods consumption. Banking becomes the
only means of tax avoidance. With leisure and no banking, c = 0.638. With leisure and banking, c rises a bit to
0.646.14
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9 Discussion
On the magnitude of the welfare cost of inflation, when banking is allowed or not allowed, a closely related work
is Silva (2012). As in this paper and Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998), Silva also finds that banking expands
with the rate of inflation. Silva uses a Jovanovic (1982) type Baumol (1952) - Tobin (1956) approach whereby
the timing of the withdrawals of money from the bank is modeled so as to create an endogenous velocity. This
allows for a cost of banking to enter the money demand and the welfare cost calculation. Silva’s approach is
related to the use of the bank production function here as in the so-called ”financial intermediation approach
to banking” (Degryse, Kim, and Ongena 2009). Silva finds a robust estimate for a 10% inflation instead of zero
of about 0.95% (no leisure in utility) to 1.33% (with leisure in utility) as a share of output, with the banking and
endogenous velocity. This compares fairly closely to this paper’s baseline estimate of 1.65% for a like amount
of inflation with banking and leisure.
Alternatively, without banking, but with leisure, this paper finds a 0.12 estimate for a 10% inflation instead
of zero. This compares for example to Silva’s (2012) 0.36% estimate where banking is not endogenous, but there
is leisure in utility; Silva also uses log utility as in this paper and has a calibration for leisure preference which
is higher than in this paper. See Silva and Adao and Silva (2018) for a review of other estimates in the literature;
for example Cooley and Hansen (1989) also have a comparatively low welfare cost estimate with a cash-only
economy, as in this paper. For another use of banking intermediation costs to estimate welfare measures, in this
case a Leontieff banking production function for intertemporal loans, see Antunes, Cavalcanti, and Villamil
(2013).
Lucas (2000) and Silva (2012) define the welfare cost as the compensation to equilibrium consumption necessary to keep the consumer utility the same when facing a certain high inflation relative to facing either the
optimum (of R = 0 in Lucas) or a lower inflation rate such as zero (in Silva), but without any leisure adjustment.
This paper differs slightly by defining the welfare cost by the amount of goods that need to be transferred to the
consumer to make the consumer indifferent between some high inflation rate versus having no such transfer
and facing the Friedman optimum of R = 0. This compensating income transfer is not to the optimum consumption bundle, but rather to the budget of the consumer, through equation (24), as in Gillman (1993; equation 16).
This means that here leisure and consumption adjust optimally given the transfer z.
The welfare cost of inflation in this paper is the deadweight loss from raising money through the inflation
tax for government expenditure, with the inflation tax proceeds returned as lump sum income. Therefore the
welfare loss is only from the distortions of induced substitution from goods towards leisure, plus the cost of
banking under the marginal cost curve in Figure 1, up to the equilibrium q/c. This cost of banking is also
measured by the area under the money demand m/c in Figure 2 up to the equilibrium quantity of money
per unit of consumption, m/c. Others such as Adao and Silva (2018) and Cooley and Hansen (1991) consider
broader financing possibilities including both the inflation tax and other forms of direct taxation such as on
labor.
The equalization of the marginal cost of money to its marginal benefit, as in equation (20), is the equilibrium
condition found in monetary economies that leads directly to the model’s underlying demand for money function. Lucas (2000) carefully qualifies this equilibrium condition as what we can call a money demand function,
within a representative consumer framework with competitive price-taking consumers and firms. This equilibrium condition can be found since Samuelson’s (1947) static money-in-the-utility function (MIUF) economy, for
example with utility being specified as 𝑢 (𝑚, 𝑐), and carried on in current dynamic MIUF economies. The MIUF
equilibrium condition is that the marginal rate of substitution between money and goods equals the nominal
interest rate: (𝑢𝑚 /𝑢𝑐 ) = 𝑅. Given the utility function, the money demand results.
Exchange economies such as Lucas (1980) bring the margin into play through the ratio of the shadow value of
the exchange constraint to the shadow value of the budget constraint, whereby again it results albeit implicitly
using envelop conditions that the ratio of the marginal utility of money to that of goods equals the nominal
interest rate. However such cash-in-advance exchange economies without credit typically have a velocity set at
one, making them not well-poised to estimate the welfare cost of inflation. In shopping time models, velocity is
made endogenous, through the equilibrium condition given by 𝑅 = −𝑤𝑔𝑚 , using the 𝑔 (𝑐, 𝑚) for the shopping
time function as above. The marginal cost of money equals the marginal benefit of reducing the value of time
needed for shopping by using one more unit of money; the money demand then results once g is specified in
terms of c and m.
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King and Plosser (1984) instead posed the question of how to include exchange credit through banking
production in a general equilibrium representative agent model of the real business cycle variant that also
includes money. They conclude that using labor and capital in the production function of banking gives a constant marginal cost of credit. In turn this constant marginal credit cost could have no unique equilibrium with a
constant marginal cost of money, this being the nominal interest rate.15 At the same time, in the banking microeconomic literature, Clark (1984) argues that the bank production function needs to include not just labor and
capital but also deposited funds, all in a Cobb-Douglas form. Hancock (1985) successfully validates this form
through estimation of the bank production function. This production form with deposits included has been
used since empirically since in the banking literature, such as in Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Wheelock
and Wilson (2012), and as reviewed in Degryse, Kim, and Ongena (2009).
The advantage of using the Clark (1984) form in general equilibrium, as in Gillman and Kejak (2011), is
that the units get corrected in this way so as to allow a unique equilibrium of credit and money. In particular,
the marginal cost of credit, per unit of deposits, equals the marginal cost of money, per unit of goods. With
deposits equal to goods in equilibrium in these models, the unit is a good for the marginal cost of both credit
and money. On a per unit of goods basis, the marginal cost of credit endogenously is upwards sloping and so
provides a unique equilibrium for a given interest rate. This in turn gives the money demand as a residual of
the credit demand, with the sum of money and credit purchases equaling total goods consumed and produced
per period (in a model without capital).
In contrast, to get around the necessity of having an upward sloping marginal cost of banking, for example,
Berk and Green (2004) study mutual funds with the assumption of a convex cost function such that there is an
upward sloping marginal cost of the mutual funds. This enables a unique equilibrium of how much mutual
funds to produce with the given interest rate. Others take a similar approach of assuming a convex cost of credit
function.
Lucas and Stokey (1983, 1987)) model money and exchange credit in their cash-good, credit-good extension
of the Lucas (1980) cash-in-advance economy. This includes no real resource of credit use, in the sense that King
and Plosser (1984) discuss, and as is used in this paper, as well as in Silva (2012), Adao and Silva (2018), and
Antunes, Cavalcanti, and Villamil (2013). The credit good in the Lucas-Stokey model has a shadow price of one,
while the cash good has a shadow price of 1 + R, as in the original Lucas (1980) CIA model. Each the cash and
credit goods separately enter the utility function, so some of the cash good is bought according to preferences.
There is no real resource use of credit and Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas (1991) find this model inconsistent
with certain velocity evidence; see Silva (2012) for a related discussion on endogenous velocity approaches in
the literature.
Lucas (2000) instead turns to each a Sidrauski (1967a and 1967b) money in the utility function model (MIUF)
and a McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) shopping time model to estimate welfare cost, with the latter explicitly
involving real resource cost in evading the inflation tax. There Lucas also shows elegantly how to backwards
engineer the money demand function using a general specification of MIUF model, while allowing either the
Cagan or Baumol-Tobin form in his shopping time model.
The banking time approach here produces an endogenous money demand from the other end without predetermination of money demand. Rather than assuming a utility function or transaction cost function specifically designed to yield the desired money demand, the bank approach lets the form of the bank production
function determine the form of the money demand. This is advantageous in giving estimates of welfare cost
because the degree of free parameters gets restricted by the bank production function and information on the
parameters of that function. While the calibration of the cost of banking in this paper is rudimentary, other innovative approaches are possible that estimate banking costs in different ways, such as using national income
accounts and detailed bank industry data.

10 Policy implications
Policy implications are tangible in the following sense, related to Adao and Silva (2018). With a 2% inflation rate
instead of 0, the amount of money being generated through money printing to pay for US federal expenditure
𝑀 −𝑀
can be calculated. The real value of the inflation tax at each year t equals 𝑡+1𝑃 𝑡 . As a percent of GDP, this
𝑡

𝑀𝑡+1 −𝑀𝑡
. In turn this pays for some percent of federal government
𝑃𝑡 𝑦𝑡
𝑀𝑡+1 −𝑀𝑡
= 𝜙. With a constant money supply growth rate of
expenditure, as a percent of GDP, call it ϕ, so that 𝑃 𝑦
𝑡 𝑡
𝜎𝑀𝑡
𝜎.
σ, then 𝜙 = 𝑃 𝑦 , and in terms of velocity, with V ≡ y/m, then 𝜙 = 𝑉
𝑡 𝑡

money supply increase can be expressed as
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The inflation tax revenue as a share of output
as 𝜙 =

𝑀𝑡+1 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡+1 𝑃𝑡
𝑦𝑡

𝑀
− 𝑃𝑡
𝑡

=

𝑃
𝑚𝑡+1 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑡

𝑦𝑡

−𝑚𝑡

𝑀𝑡+1 −𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡 𝑦𝑡

rewrites in terms of the inflation rate by expressing it
𝑃𝑡+1
−1, and a stable velocity V over time, and
𝑃𝑡
𝑦𝑡+1
𝑚𝑡+1
𝑚𝑡
𝑦𝑡 −1, then 𝜙 = 𝑦𝑡+1 (1 + 𝑔𝑦𝑡+1 ) (1 + 𝜋𝑡+1 )− 𝑦𝑡 . With

. With the inflation rate of 𝜋𝑡+1 =

the growth rate of real output as being denoted by 𝑔𝑦𝑡+1 ≡
a stable V and gy over time, 𝜙 =

1
𝑉

[(1 + 𝑔𝑦 ) (1 + 𝜋) − 1]. Extending the analysis to allow a positive growth

rate in the economy, the inflation rate to achieve a share ϕ is 𝜋 =
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is σ = ϕV. Thus 𝜋 =

𝜎−𝑔𝑦
.
1+𝑔𝑦

𝜂𝑉−𝑔𝑦
,
1+𝑔𝑦

while the money supply growth rate

With a 2% inflation rate, and say a 2% growth rate in output, then the money supply

growth rate would be (1.02) (0.02) + 0.02 = 0.0404, about 4%. This is similar to Friedman’s (1960) money supply
rule.
The amount of government spending as a share of output, ϕ, financed with this 4% money supply growth is
σ/V. Consider the velocity of the monetary aggregate that may best correspond to the inflation tax. As of May
2018, the US monetary base and M1 were both the same at $3.7 trillion, which is (3.7) /20 = 0.185, or 18.5% of
the $20 trillion US output. In current velocity terms, this is a 20/3.7 = 5. 41 velocity. Letting V = 5.41, then the
share of output financed, ϕ, by the 2 inflation is 0.04/5.41 = 0.0074, or 0.74%. This is equal to $20(0.0074) = $0.148
trillion, or $148 billion a year. Total US Federal government expenditure is $4.5 trillion for 2018:Q1. So under
148
the assumptions made, the 2% inflation rate instead of zero currently yields 4479
= 0.033, or 3.3% of federal
government expenditure. Were velocity higher, then the percent of revenue from inflation finance would be
less, a point emphasized in Adao and Silva (2018).
The middle range welfare cost calculation found above implies, using the M1 aggregate, that some $33 billion
is a deadweight loss on route to raising $148 billion in additional spending for the government, or about a 20%
economic loss rate. Consider also how the Fed has used the inflation tax revenue which it is supposed to return
to the US Treasury (as the Fed’s “profit”). From September 2009 to May 2018, excess reserves held at the Fed
have averaged on a monthly basis $1.763 trillion. Over the same period the monthly average Interest On Excess
Reserves (IOER) rate was 0.45%. Using these averages, a simple estimate is that the Fed directly paid banks
$(1.763)0.45=$0.793 trillion, or $793 billion since 2009. This means that rather than returning all of the inflation
tax revenue to the Treasury, an amount equal to some 5 years of the inflation tax revenue from a 2% inflation
rate as calculated above, at $148 billion a year, was instead used to subsidize the bank sector, in violation of
previous Fed policy (before 2008) not to influence unduly any one sector of the economy. Or put differently, the
somewhat less than $33 billion welfare cost per year, for the period from November 2009 to May 2018 when the
CPI inflation rate averaged 1.7% on a monthly basis, implies a cumulative loss nearing some $330 billion, close
to half of the amount that the Fed paid directly to banks.
The 2018 Fed operating budget is reported by the Fed to be $4.45 billion. If the Fed 2% inflation target instead
of zero is causing a welfare loss of some $33 billion, then the total economic cost of the current Fed policy
including all of their operating cost is about $37 billion. With a zero inflation target, the $33 billion would be
saved. A simple way to successfully keep the inflation rate around zero, is to set the quarterly money supply
growth rate σ, for the current quarter, equal to the output growth rate, gy , reported for the previous quarter.
Then money supply and demand would be about equal over time. As a simple rule that would enforce the 1978
Act inflation target, this would also presumably eliminate the welfare loss associated with a 2% instead of zero
inflation rate.
The inflation tax revenue with a zero inflation rate would then be only the “natural seigniorage” from keeping a stable value of the government’s currency. With a 2% growth rate of output, this money supply increase,
of the monetary base or M1 both at $3.7 trillion in 2018, still yields a significant revenue of $(0.02)3.7 = 0.074 trillion, or $74 billion, in current dollars. This would be how much inflation tax the Fed would raise each year. This
would in turn allow, after budget expense, some $70 billion to be returned to Treasury, or 1.6% ( 0.70
= 0.16) of
4.5
government expenditures, by following the 1978 Act that governs current Fed policy, while saving the welfare
cost of some $7 to $72 billion a year.

11 Conclusion
The model provides a microeconomic founded way to provide an estimate of the welfare cost of inflation for
any inflation rate. Estimates are provided under a baseline and two alternative calibrations. The estimates are
also compared with different model cases such as with no banking and with no leisure. With banking time, the
cost estimate is precisely consistent with a shopping time approach in its use of real resources, but formulated
using a bank production function of the Clark (1984) variety. This replaces an arbitrary transaction cost function
designed to give a certain money demand function with a marginal cost of banking consistent with the banking
literature such that the money demand is implied as a result.
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Cost estimates are made for a 10% inflation rate instead of zero inflation, and for a 2% inflation rate instead
of zero. A zero inflation rate is put forth as the target in the 1978 Amendments to the 1946 Act governing Fed
policy. For a 2% inflation rate instead of zero, using the paper’s M1 calibration, the cost estimate is $33 billion
a year. This magnitude suggests it is worth considering why the Fed targets 2% inflation rather than following
the 1978 US Act prescribing zero inflation. This is especially true now that the unemployment rate has fallen
below the 4% target also found in the 1978 US Act, leaving the Fed without an escape hatch from the 1978 Act.
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Notes
1 See Silva (2012), for example, in Table 2, with his N fixed and with his a = 0. See also Antunes, Cavalcanti, and Villamil (2013) who use a
similar banking approach in a different context.
2 https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/humphrey_hawkins_act#footnote3.
3 Public Law 95–523, passed October 27, 1978, is known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act or officially within its Section 1 as “Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978”.https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/95/hr50/text.
Alternatively, a pdf of the law is found at https://onlabor.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/STATUTE-92-Pg1887.pdf.
4 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATENSA.
5 “Our method of analysis, it will have appeared, is simply an extension of the ordinary method of value theory. In value theory, we take
a private individual’s income and expenditure account; we ask which of the items in that account are under the individual’s own control,
and then how he will adjust these items in order to reach a most preferred position. On the production side, we make a similar analysis
of the profit and loss account of the firm. My suggestion is that monetary theory needs to be based again upon a similar analysis, but this
time, not of an income account, but of a capital account, a balance sheet. We have to concentrate on the forces which make assets and
liabilities what they are. So as far as banking theory is concerned, this is really the method which is currently adopted; though the essence
of the problem is there somewhat obscured by the fact that banks, in their efforts to reach their “ most preferred position ” are hampered or
assisted by the existence of conventionial or legally obligatory reserve ratios. For theoretical purposes, this fact ought only to be introduced
at a rather late stage; if that is done, then my suggestion can be expressed by saying that we ought to regard every individual in the
community as being, on a small scale, a bank. Monetary theory becomes a sort of generalisation of banking theory” (bold added, p.
12, Hicks 1935).
6 Using the centralized banking approach in this paper, consumption goods equal deposits and so enter the bank production function
instead of deposits, while Gillman and Kejak (2011) decentralize the bank sector and so the consumer chooses deposits subject to the
constraint that deposits equal consumption; this yields that the return on deposits Rd equals the shadow value of the deposit constraint (d
= c). The bank optimization with respect to deposits d in turn yields the profit per unit of deposits given back to the consumer, who owns
𝑞
𝑞
the bank, whereby 𝑅𝑑 = 𝑅 (1 − 𝛾) 𝑑 = 𝑅 (1 − 𝛾) 𝑐 .
7 In a shopping time economy, with leisure, this marginal rate is

𝑥𝑡
𝛼𝑐𝑡

1+𝑤𝑔𝑐 (𝑚𝑡 ,𝑐𝑡 )
, where 𝑠 = 𝑔 (𝑚𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡 ) is the standard shopping time
𝑤
1+𝑅𝑡 𝑔𝑐 (𝑚𝑡 ,𝑐𝑡 )/𝑔𝑚 (𝑚𝑡 ,𝑐𝑡 )
𝑐𝑡
𝑥𝑡
then 𝛼𝑐𝑡 =
, and with 𝑠𝑡 ≡ 𝑔 (𝑐𝑡 , 𝑚𝑡 ) = 𝑘𝑚
,
𝑤
𝑡

=

function; since 𝑅𝑡 = −𝑤𝑔𝑚 (𝑚𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡 ) is another equilibrium conditions,
𝑚

1+𝑅𝑡 𝑐 𝑡

1+𝑎𝑡 𝑅𝑡 +(1−𝑎𝑡 )𝛾𝑅𝑡
𝑥𝑡
𝑡
𝑡𝑅
=
= 1+𝑎
as in this paper’s model.
as in Lucas (2000), then 𝛼𝑐
𝑤
𝑤
𝑤 , in our notation, rather than
𝑡
8 Explaining how short term interest rates could fall below the inflation rate for the extended period since the Great Recession is the subject
matter of Csabafi et al. (2018), using a related model with shocks to both goods and banking sectors.
9 Note that this graph, which is normalized by c, is the same for any value of leisure preference 𝛼.
(0.11)

10

𝑧
𝑤

(𝑅) + 1 =

(0.11)

1

1

1
⎞
⎛ (𝑅)(0.11) 1−(0.11)
⎞
⎛ ⎛
⎞
(𝑅)(0.11) 1−(0.11)
⎜
⎟
(1.01) 1−(0.11) ⎟
(1.01) 1−(0.11) ⎟
1+1((𝑅)(0.11)(1.01)/1) 1−0.11 +1⎜
)
)
⎜1−(
⎟(𝑅)+⎜
⎜(
⎟(0.11)(𝑅)⎟
⎜1+⎜
⎟
1
1
⎠
⎝
⎠
⎝ ⎝
⎠
(0.11)

(0.11)

1

0.5/(1+0.5)

1

⎞
⎛ (𝑅)(0.11) 1−(0.11)
⎞
⎛ ⎛
⎞
(𝑅)(0.11) 1−(0.11)
⎜
⎟
(1+1)⎜
(1.01) 1−(0.11) ⎟
(1.01) 1−(0.11) ⎟
)
)
⎜1−(
⎟(𝑅)+⎜
⎜(
⎟(0.11)(𝑅)⎟
⎜1+⎜
⎟
1
1
⎠
⎝
⎠
⎝ ⎝
⎠
1

̂ =
11 (𝑧/𝑤)
0.11
12 − 1−0.11

13

0.11
0.11
1
0.11
( 1 ) 1−0.11 (0.133) 1−0.11 (1.01) 1−0.11
0.11
0.11
1
1−( 0.11
) 1−0.11 (0.133) 1−0.11 (1.01) 1−0.11
1

0.11 0.60
1−0.11 0.40

14 𝑐 =

1+1((0.133)(0.11)(1.01)/1) 1−0.11 +1(1+0.40(0.133)+0.60(0.11)(0.133))
(1+1)(1+0.40(0.133)+0.60(0.11)(0.133))1/(1+1)

+

− 1:
(0.11)

1

(1 + (0.133) (1 − ( (0.133)(0.11)
) 1−(0.11) (1.01) 1−(0.11) ))
1
0.11

0.11

1

0.11 1−0.11
⎛
⎞
⎜
(
)
(0.133) 1−0.11 (1.01) 1−0.11
⎜
⎟
1 ⎟
1
⎜1+ 0.11
0.40(0.5)(0.133)⎜
(1−0.11+ 0.5 )⎟
⎟
0.11
⎜
⎟
0.11
1
⎜ 1−0.11
⎟
0.11 1−0.11
1−0.11
1−0.11
)
(0.133)
(1.01)
1−(
⎝
⎠
1
1

1+1(0.133(0.11)1.01/1) 1−0.11 +(0.5)(1+0.40(0.133))+0.11(0.133)0.60(1+0.5)
1
1

.

1+1(0.133(0.11)1.01/1) 1−0.11 +(0.5)(1+0.40(0.133))+0.11(0.133)0.60(1+0.5)

15 See Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998) and Li (2000) where this issue is resolved by either assuming a money demand or assuming
dropping the Cobb-Douglas form by assuming diminishing returns in labor, with no capital.
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